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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE IMPACT OF BOSTOCK V. CLAYTON COUNTY ON ACCESS TO
HEALTH CARE FOR LGBTQ PERSONS
ABSTRACT
LGBTQ individuals face countless acts of discrimination in health care
insurance and delivery. In spite of this inequality, there are zero LGBTQinclusive health insurance protections in over half of the United States. Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act (Title VII) and Section 1557 of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (ACA) are two federal statutes that prohibit discrimination,
in relevant part, on the basis of sex. Both federal statutes have been greatly
impacted by the Supreme Court decision in Bostock v. Clayton County, which
interpreted “sex” in Title VII to include gender identity and sexual orientation.
This Article explains how Bostock protects LGBTQ persons from discrimination
in employer-provided health insurance under Title VII. Bostock’s scope extends
beyond health insurance and into health care delivery, as demonstrated by its
applicability to Section 1557 of the ACA (Section 1557). This Article
demonstrates how Section 1557—where its enabling statutes do not include Title
VII—should prohibit discrimination regardless of sexual orientation and gender
identity. Lastly, this Article emphasizes the importance of state action, for
example in public accommodations laws, in the absence of clear and explicit
federal LGBTQ protections.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The lives of LGBTQ persons are constantly threatened by discrimination in
health care insurance and health care delivery through either delays or denials
of medically necessary care. 1 In addition, LGBTQ persons frequently encounter
providers who use harsh language, refuse to touch patients, and improperly
blame patients for their health status. 2 LGBTQ persons who experience such
discrimination are at risk of avoiding medical help altogether, creating a
negative, long-lasting impact on health outcomes. 3 Yet, despite these evident
disparities, twenty-seven states and four territories have no laws providing
LGBTQ-inclusive health insurance protections on the basis of sexual orientation
or gender identity, and forty-five percent of LGBTQ individuals live in such
states. 4 Only sixteen states, one territory, and the District of Columbia (D.C.)
expressly prohibit such discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender
identity, 5 although such prohibitions have limited application to employerprovided health insurance. 6 And only twenty-four states and D.C. explicitly
prohibit transgender exclusions in health insurance coverage, which are
“policies that bar health insurers from explicitly refusing to cover transgenderrelated health care benefits.” 7
Federal law has long prohibited discrimination in health care insurance and
delivery, but whether these laws apply to the LGBTQ community has been
controversial and unresolved in any determinative respect. First, Title VII of the
1. Shabab Ahmed Mirza & Caitlin Rooney, Discrimination Prevents LGBTQ People from
Accessing Health Care, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.americanprogress
.org/issues/lgbtq-rights/news/2018/01/18/445130/discrimination-prevents-lgbtq-people-accessing
-health-care/.
2. LAMBDA LEGAL, WHEN HEALTH CARE ISN’T CARING: LAMBDA LEGAL’S SURVEY ON
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST LGBT PEOPLE WITH HIV 10 (2010).
3. Mirza & Rooney, supra note 1; How Discrimination Impacts LGBTQ Healthcare, ST.
CATHERINE U. (Apr. 15, 2021), https://www.stkate.edu/academics/healthcare-degrees/lgbtqhealth-discrimination; see also Off. of Disease Prevention & Health Promotion, Lesbian, Gay,
Bisexual, and Transgender Health, HEALTHYPEOPLE.GOV, https://www.healthypeople.gov/2020
/topics-objectives/topic/lesbian-gay-bisexual-and-transgender-health (last visited Mar. 4, 2021)
(“Research suggests that LGBT individuals face health disparities linked to societal stigma,
discrimination, and denial of their civil and human rights.”).
4. Equality Maps: Healthcare Laws and Policies, MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT,
https://www.lgbtmap.org/equality-maps/healthcare_laws_and_policies (last visited Mar. 30,
2022). Arkansas previously refused to provide such insurance protections, raising the number of
total states to twenty-eight, but now Arkansas law explicitly allows insurers to refuse to cover
gender-affirming care. Id.; see H.B. 1570, 93d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2021). Note a federal
judge has issued a temporary injunction, preventing the law from taking effect while litigation is
pending. Brandt v. Rutledge, No. 4:21CV00450, 2021 WL 3292057, at *7 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 2,
2021).
5. Equality Maps: Healthcare Laws and Policies, supra note 4.
6. See discussion infra Section IV.A.
7. Equality Maps: Healthcare Laws and Policies, supra note 4 (emphasis added).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2022]

BOSTOCK ON ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE

487

Civil Rights Act (Title VII) prohibits discrimination in employee benefits,
including health insurance, 8 but until the Supreme Court ruling in Bostock v.
Clayton County, it was not clear whether this prohibition covered health benefits
needed by LGBTQ persons. Second, Section 1557 of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (ACA)9 prohibits both health care providers (i.e., delivery)
and insurance companies (i.e., coverage) from engaging in discrimination based
on sex. 10 Whether, however, this provision applies to LGBTQ status and gender
identity has been a matter of great contention. 11 Bostock provides a resolution to
this controversy.
In a six-to-three decision, the Supreme Court in Bostock held that an
employer who fires an individual merely for being gay or transgender violates
the sex discrimination prohibition under only Title VII. 12 Justice Neil M.
Gorsuch, writing for the majority, interprets the term “sex,” in the context of
employment under Title VII, to include sexual orientation and gender identity. 13
Because Title VII applies to employer-provided health insurance, Bostock’s
interpretation of “sex” extends to employee health benefits. 14 This is significant
for the nearly fifty percent of the population who receive health insurance
coverage through their employment. 15 And although so many employees are
excluded from Bostock’s protections within Title VII, its impact extends more
broadly because of its application to the interpretation of Section 1557 of the
ACA (Section 1557). 16
Section 1557 prohibits discrimination in health insurance more broadly than
insurance provided by employers under Title VII. An individual shall not “be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under, any health program or activity, any part of which is
receiving Federal financial assistance, including contracts of insurance.” 17 The
8. See discussion infra Section III.A.
9. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, 124 Stat. 119, 260
(2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18116).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 18116(a); Mirza & Rooney, supra note 1.
11. See discussion infra Parts V and VI.
12. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1736–37, 1754 (2020).
13. Id. at 1736–37.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1); see Katharine Marshall & Kaye Pestaina, Justices’ Title VII
Ruling on LGBTQ Bias Has Health Benefit Impacts, MERCER (June 15, 2020), https://www.mercer
.com/our-thinking/law-and-policy-group/justices-title-vii-ruling-on-lgbtq-bias-has-heatlh-benefitimpacts.html.
15. Health Insurance Coverage of the Total Population, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (2019),
https://www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/total-population/?dataView=1&currentTimeframe=
0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D (Select
“Percent” in the data view table.).
16. See discussion infra Part VI.
17. 42 U.S.C. § 18116(a) (emphasis added); see Brietta R. Clark, Elizabeth Pendo & Gabriella
Garbero, Sex-Based Discrimination in Healthcare Under Section 1557: The New Final Rule and
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statute also prohibits discrimination in health care delivery. 18 For entities mostly
engaged in the business of health care that receive federal funding, Section 1557
applies to their entire operation, e.g., health care delivery and financing. 19 This
includes most providers that take Medicare and Medicaid, such as hospitals and
community health centers. 20
Although Section 1557 prohibits discrimination in health insurance and
health care delivery on the basis of “sex,” whether that prohibition extends to
LGBTQ status has been the subject of great controversy and of contradictory
administrative regulations issued by the Obama and Trump administrations. The
Obama administration promulgated regulations (2016 Final Rule) that included
sex stereotyping and gender identity in the definition of “sex.” 21 The Trump
administration rescinded the Obama-era regulations and promulgated new
regulations (2020 Final Rule) that omit gender identity and sex stereotyping
from the definition of “sex.” 22 Following this, in January 2021, Joseph R. Biden,
Jr. signed Executive Order 13,988 (EO 13,988), which directs all federal
agencies that enforce statutes prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex to
review and ascertain whether Bostock impacts those regulations. 23 Because the
language used in Title VII is identical to the language used in Section 1557, 24
Bostock should be applied to interpret Section 1557 as prohibiting sex
discrimination based on gender identity and transgender status.
This Article demonstrates how Bostock applies to protect against LGBTQ
discrimination in employer-provided health insurance under Title VII. Because
Bostock interprets “sex” in Title VII to include gender identity and sexual
Supreme Court Developments, A.B.A. HEALTH LAW., Oct. 2020, at 5–6 (examining the regulatory
and litigation landscape for defining and enforcing Section 1557 of the ACA’s prohibition on sex
discrimination in health care); Sidney D. Watson, Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act: Civil
Rights, Health Reform, Race, and Equity, 55 HOWARD L.J. 855, 859–60, 872–73 (2012) (discussing
the impact of Section 1557 on equitable access to health insurance and health care across racial
lines).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 18116(a).
19. Id.
20. Off. for C.R., Section 1557: Frequently Asked Questions, HHS.GOV, https://www.hhs.gov
/civil-rights/for-individuals/section-1557/1557faqs/index.html (last updated May 18, 2017).
21. Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. 31,376, 31,387 (May
18, 2016) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 92). Gender identity includes both gender expression and
transgender status. Id. at 31,388.
22. Nondiscrimination in Health and Health Education Programs or Activities, Delegation of
Authority, 85 Fed. Reg. 37,160, 37,160–62 (June 19, 2020) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 438,
440, 460 and 45 C.F.R. pt. 86, 92, 147, 155, 156). As a result of these omissions, litigation is
pending. See Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 3, 7, Whitman-Walker Clinic, Inc.
v. U.S. DHHS, No. 1:20-cv-01630 (D.D.C. June 22, 2020); Complaint at 1, 6, Bos. All. of Gay,
Lesbian, Bisexual & Transgender Youth v. U.S. DHHS, No. 1:20-cv-11297 (D. Mass. July 9,
2020).
23. Exec. Order No. 13,988, 86 Fed. Reg. 7023, 7023 (Jan. 25, 2021).
24. See discussion infra Section VI.A.
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orientation and Title VII prohibits discrimination in employee benefits on the
basis of sex, employers cannot discriminate on the basis of gender identity or
sexual orientation in health benefits plans. As a result, employer-provided health
insurance must incorporate LGBTQ protections and coverage to assure that they
are in compliance with Title VII.
This Article also argues that Section 1557, which prohibits discrimination
on the basis of “sex” in both health insurance and health care delivery that fall
within the bounds of this statute, should be interpreted to include a prohibition
against discrimination against LGBTQ persons (i.e., sexual orientation and
gender identity). Although Bostock does not interpret Section 1557, the majority
opinion’s broad approach to interpreting Title VII should be applied to Section
1557 and others like it.
This Article further points out the significance of states incorporating sexual
orientation and gender identity in their public accommodations law. 25 Bostock—
which interpreted a federal statute—does not extend protections to LGBTQ
persons in places of public accommodation, as controlled by federal law. This is
because federal public accommodations law does not explicitly prohibit “sex”
discrimination, which is precisely what Bostock impacts. As a result, states must
take action to protect LGBTQ persons in public spaces, like hospitals, doctors’
offices, and other public health care entities.
First, Part II provides an overview of Bostock’s majority and dissenting
opinions, as well as Justice Gorsuch’s textualist approach to interpreting Title
VII. Next, Part III examines the most common health benefit supplied by
employers—health insurance—under Title VII. Part IV then discusses how
employers might assure LGBTQ protections within health coverage benefits
under Title VII, illustrated by an employer assessment tool and recent responses
in state law. Part V briefly describes how the Obama and Trump administrations
each issued regulations to implement Section 1557’s nondiscrimination
provision, with the Obama administration including gender identity/sex
stereotyping within the definition of “sex” under the statute and the Trump
administration excluding it. Part VI further examines the influence of Bostock
on health care by applying Bostock’s approach to statutory interpretation of the
term “sex” to Section 1557. This Part argues that President Trump’s 2020 Final
Rule must be rejected as inconsistent with the statute and argues that the review
mandated by EO 13,988 must conclude that Section 1557’s prohibition of
discrimination based on sex includes sexual orientation and gender identity.
Lastly, Part VII demonstrates the importance of state public accommodations
laws to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender
identity in public health care spaces.

25. See discussion infra Part VII.
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II. OVERVIEW OF BOSTOCK
A.

The Consolidation of Three Cases 26

Bostock consolidates three separate cases that all address discrimination on
the basis of sex under Title VII. The first plaintiff, Gerald Bostock, worked as a
child welfare advocate for Clayton County, Georgia, where the county won
several national awards under his management. 27 Despite Mr. Bostock’s
accomplishments, he was fired for conduct “unbecoming” a county employee
shortly after participating in a gay recreational softball league. 28 The second
plaintiff, Donald Zarda, was employed by Altitude Express in New York as a
skydiving instructor. 29 Despite working for the company for several years, Mr.
Zarda was fired days after mentioning that he was gay. 30 The last plaintiff,
Aimee Stephens, worked at R. G. & G. R. Harris Funeral Homes in Michigan,
where she initially presented herself as a male. 31 In her sixth year with the
company, however, Ms. Stephens decided to “live and work full-time as a
woman,” particularly after clinicians diagnosed her with gender dysphoria and
advised that she live as a woman. 32 Following this, the funeral home fired Ms.
Stephens. 33
In each of these cases, an employer allegedly fired an employee simply for
being homosexual or transgender, causing each employee to sue, alleging
“unlawful discrimination on the basis of sex” under Title VII. 34 Lower courts
were unable to come to a consistent conclusion; the Eleventh Circuit held that
Title VII “does not prohibit employers from firing employees for being gay,”
while the Second and Sixth Circuits held that sexual orientation and transgender
status, respectively, are protected under Title VII’s sex discrimination
prohibition. 35
B.

Case Holding

Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined. The
majority held: “An employer violates Title VII when it intentionally fires an

26. Bostock v. Clayton County was consolidated with Altitude Express, Inc. v. Zarda and R.G.
& G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
27. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1737 (2020).
28. Id. at 1737–38.
29. Id. at 1738.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1738.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
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individual employee based in part on sex.” 36 A statutory violation occurs
whether or not other factors besides an individual’s “sex” exists in relation to
the employer’s actions. 37 It is impossible to discriminate against an individual
for being either homosexual or transgender without discriminating on the basis
of sex, 38 because the first cannot happen without the second. Because
discrimination on the basis of homosexuality or transgender status requires an
employer to intentionally treat individual employees differently because of their
sex, Title VII is violated when an employee suffers from intentional
discrimination because of such identities. 39
C. Dissenting Views
Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined,
while Justice Kavanaugh filed a separate dissenting opinion. Justice Alito
opened his dissent by criticizing the majority opinion: “There is only one word
for what the Court has done today: legislation.” 40 In Justice Alito’s views, the
opinion does not merely enforce the terms of the statute, but rather takes on a
new approach of updating old statutes so that they “better reflect the current
values of society.” 41 Justice Alito also emphasizes that the question in Bostock
is not whether discrimination because of sexual orientation or gender identity
should be outlawed, but whether Congress did that in 1964; to him, “it
indisputably did not.” 42 Interestingly, Justice Alito notes that this Court’s
holding may intensify the debate on health benefits since “[t]ransgender
employees have brought suit under Title VII to challenge employer-provided
health insurance plans that do not cover . . . sex reassignment surgery,” and
similar claims have been brought under the ACA. 43 Further, Justice
Kavanaugh’s dissent largely agrees with Justice Alito’s and argues that the Court
majority is acting in a legislative capacity: under the Constitution’s separation
of powers, “it was Congress’s role, not this Court’s, to amend Title VII.” 44

36. Id. at 1741.
37. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1741.
38. Id. For example, consider two employees—one, female and the other, male—who are both
attracted to men and are materially identical in the employer’s mind, but only the male employee
is fired for no reason except for his sexuality. Id. Consider an employer who fires a transgender
person who identified as a male at birth but now identifies as a female, despite retaining an identical
employee who identified as female at birth. Id. In both cases, the employer is intentionally
discriminating on the basis of sex against an employee that is otherwise tolerated in another. Id.
39. Id. at 1743.
40. Id. at 1754 (Alito, S., dissenting).
41. Id. at 1755–56 (Alito, S., dissenting).
42. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1756 (Alito, S., dissenting).
43. Id. at 1781 (Alito, S., dissenting).
44. Id. at 1837 (Kavanaugh, B., dissenting).
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D. Justice Gorsuch’s Textualist Approach
The late Justice Scalia sought to derive statutory interpretation from their
words alone and to ignore unenacted context, a theory termed “New
Textualism.” 45 Influenced by Justice Scalia, Justice Gorsuch determined the
ordinary meaning of Title VII by examining key statutory terms, assessing their
impact on the consolidated cases, and using Supreme Court precedent. 46
Notably, Justice Gorsuch did not rely on legislative history or previous agency
decisions or guidance. 47 Rather, Justice Gorsuch primarily relied on the
language of the statute or, in other words, the ordinary meaning of the text, 48
which is now shown as a possible advocacy tool for disparate treatment 49 cases
under Title VII. In fact, throughout the opinion, Justice Gorsuch emphasized that
he was following the text and nothing more. 50 And even though the outcome of
Bostock may be contrary to the intention of Title VII’s drafters, Justice Gorsuch
provides the following rationale for employing textualism:
Those who adopted the Civil Rights Act might not have anticipated their work
would lead to this particular result. Likely, they weren’t thinking about many of
the Act’s consequences that have become apparent over the years, including its
prohibition against discrimination on the basis of motherhood or its ban on the
sexual harassment of male employees. But the limits of the drafters’ imagination
supply no reason to ignore the law’s demands. When the express terms of a
statute give us one answer and extratextual considerations suggest another, it’s
no contest. Only the written word is the law[.] 51

45. Andrew Koppelman, Bostock, LGBT Discrimination, and the Subtractive Moves, 105
MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 1, 3, 6–7 (2020).
46. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1738.
47. An example of an agency is the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),
which provides guidance on Title VII. See discussion infra Part IV (explaining how the EEOC
evaluates sex-based discrimination charges against an employer’s health benefit plan by applying
either the coverage analysis or the disparate impact analysis).
48. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1739–42 (illustrating sex as a “but-for” cause through multiple
hypotheticals).
49. Disparate treatment is intentional discrimination toward an individual. As a result of
Justice Gorsuch’s opinion, sex—a protected characteristic—includes sexual orientation and gender
identity. As shown in Bostock, employees with such characteristics are considered “protected
classes” and have a claim under Title VII if they can show an employer’s conduct constituted
disparate treatment based on their protected characteristic (e.g., sexual orientation and/or gender
identity).
50. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1749. For example, Gorsuch notes that “the employers are forced to
abandon the statutory text and precedent altogether and appeal to assumptions and policy.” Id.
These fail because “[t]his Court has explained many times over many years that, when the meaning
of the statute’s terms is plain, [their] job is at an end.” Id.
51. Id. at 1737.
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Despite Justice Gorsuch’s method already producing substantial commentary on
its strengths and weaknesses, 52 discussions or critiques of such methodology are
outside the scope of this Article.
III. EMPLOYER-PROVIDED INSURANCE UNDER TITLE VII AND THE EEOC
A.

Title VII

For employers with fifteen or more employees, Title VII makes it “unlawful
employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to
his [or her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 53 Title
VII forbids discrimination in any aspect of employment, including: hiring and
firing; compensation or classification of employees; promotion or layoff;
marketing; trainings; retirement; disability leave; or other terms and conditions
of employment. 54 Title VII’s inclusion of “terms and conditions” indicates that
employer-sponsored health benefits are covered under Title VII, given that
health insurance is typically included as part of the employment contract. 55
According to the Kaiser Family Foundation, about 158,000,000 people (or about
49.6% of the U.S. population) receive employer-provided health insurance
coverage. 56
There has been disagreement on whether Title VII protects LGBTQ workers
against discrimination—that is, until Bostock. The Court, however, had
previously held that employment discrimination based on sexual stereotypes
violates Title VII 57 and held that an individual can file a same-sex sexual
harassment claim under Title VII. 58 In fact, these cases have been used to argue
that “sex” under Title VII reaches gender identity and transgender status. 59
52. See, e.g., Nelson Lund, Unleashed and Unbound: Living Textualism in Bostock v. Clayton
County, 21 FEDERALIST SOC’Y REV. 158, 158 (2020); Hunter Poindexter, A Textualist’s Dream:
Reviewing Justice Gorsuch’s Opinion in Bostock v. Clayton County, U. CIN. L. REV. (June 23,
2020), https://uclawreview.org/2020/06/23/a-textualists-dream-reviewing-justice-gorsuchs-opin
ion-in-bostock-v-clayton-county/; Benjamin Eidelson, Dimensional Disparate Treatment, 95 S.
CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1).
54. Federal Laws Prohibiting Job Discrimination Questions and Answers, U.S. EQUAL EMP.
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/fact-sheet/federal-laws-prohibiting-job-discrimina
tion-questions-and-answers (last updated Nov. 21, 2009).
55. Marshall & Pestaina, supra note 14.
56. Health Insurance Coverage of the Total Population, supra note 15.
57. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989).
58. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998).
59. See Macy v. Holder, Appeal No. 0120120821, Agency No. ATF–2011–00751 (EEOC
Apr. 20, 2012); Baldwin v. Foxx, Appeal No. 0120133080, Agency No. 2012-24738-FAA-03
(EEOC July 15, 2015). Bostock is consistent with this line of EEOC opinions on the term “sex” in
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Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

Established by Congress and the Civil Rights Act, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is an independent enforcement agency that
has the authority to receive, initiate, and investigate discrimination charges filed
against employers covered by Title VII. 60 Additionally, the EEOC has the
authority to provide interpretative guidance on Title VII. 61 EEOC guidance on
health insurance states that an employer must “non-discriminatorily provide to
all similarly situated employees the same opportunity to enroll in any health
plans it offers.” 62 As a result of Title VII and EEOC guidance, an employer must
also ensure that the terms of its health benefits are non-discriminatory. 63 For the
protected category “sex,” the EEOC has long taken the position that LGBTQ
discrimination is sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII, as now supported
by Bostock. 64
IV. IMPACT OF BOSTOCK ON EMPLOYER-PROVIDED INSURANCE UNDER
TITLE VII
Bostock is not the first time a Supreme Court decision has successfully
impacted employer-sponsored health care plan requirements. 65 Although
Bostock does not resolve or even address what constitutes a discriminatory
coverage decision within a health benefits plan, the decision includes LGBTQ
status and gender identity in the conversation of sex-based discrimination and
discusses the need to safeguard protections against such discrimination within
employment. Thus, Bostock holds heavy implications for employee health
benefit plans. As indicated by law firms, employers should “review employee
Title VII. But see, e.g., Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 218 (2d Cir. 2005), overruled
by Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 107–08, 131–32 (2d Cir. 2018); Vickers v.
Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 763 (6th Cir. 2006). For a discussion of Title VII’s definitions
of sex, see Lisa J. Banks & Hannah Alejandro, Changing Definitions of Sex Under Title VII, 32
A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 25, 25–44 (2016).
60. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4; Federal Laws Prohibiting Job Discrimination Questions and
Answers, supra note 54.
61. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12.
62. See U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, No. 915.003, EEOC Compliance Manual:
Section 3 Employee Benefits (2000), https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/section-3-employeebenefits. This section provides guidance to investigate and analyze issues that “arise with regard to
life and health insurance benefits, long-term and short-term disability benefits, severance benefits,
pension or other retirement benefits, and early retirement incentives.” Id.
63. Id.
64. See Facts About Discrimination in Federal Government Employment Based on Marital
Status, Political Affiliation, Status as a Parent, Sexual Orientation, and Gender Identity, U.S.
EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/federal-sector/facts-about-discrimina
tion-federal-government-employment-based-marital-status (last visited Mar. 30, 2022).
65. For examples, see Marshall & Pestaina, supra note 14 (discussing the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act and Newport News Shipbuilding Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669 (1983)).
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benefit plan documents and policies to identify and avoid potential issues of sexbased discrimination under Title VII.” 66 One example, as advised by Mercer
Law and Policy Group, is “review[ing] the need for gender assignment as an
identifier in benefit plan administration.” 67
Additionally, the EEOC itself provides guidance on how it evaluates sexbased discrimination charges against an employer’s health benefit plan. The two
central principles applied in the evaluation are the analysis of coverage and
disparate impact. 68 Employers are advised to evaluate their health benefit plans
using these two principles, and ask themselves (1) whether differences in
coverage plans between men and women are justified (as in the risk insured
against is not mutually contractible—which means “where the underlying
condition affects, or the treatment/test is available to, both men and women”)
and (2) whether their standard to deny insurance coverage disproportionately
affects members of a protected group. 69 This guidance, however, does not have
the force and effect of law and is not meant to bind the public. 70 So, excluding
the limited and restricted guidance offered by the EEOC, 71 there is no specific
regulatory list of items or categories that must be covered in order to avoid the
risk of sex discrimination under Title VII or under Bostock. The Society for
Human Resource Management, nevertheless, attempts to resolve this ambiguity
by consolidating advice from law firms, policy groups, and human resource
experts. 72 Table 1 below provides guidance for employers on how to identify

66. Tripp VanderWal & Brett N. Liefbroer, Employee Benefit Plans Must Consider Sexual
Orientation and Gender Identity Issues After Bostock, MILLER JOHNSON ATT’YS (Sept. 2, 2020),
https://millerjohnson.com/publication/employee-benefit-plans-must-consider-sexual-orientationand-gender-identity-issues-after-bostock/; see, e.g., Brian McGinnis, After ‘Bostock’: Practical
Implications for LGBTQ+ Employees in the Workplace, FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP (Oct. 28, 2020),
https://www.foxrothschild.com/publications/after-bostock-practical-implications-for-lgbtqemployees-in-the-workplace.
67. Marshall & Pestaina, supra note 14. For example, it is prohibited to deny a transgender
woman coverage for a “prostate exam.”
68. See U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, supra note 62. Coverage analysis: employer
cannot provide different coverage to men and women where the risk insured against is mutually
contractible—that is, where the underlying condition affects, or the treatment/test is available to,
both men and women. Id. Disparate impact analysis: if the employer applies facially neutral
standards to exclude treatment for conditions or risks that disproportionately affect either men or
women, or employees on the basis of any other protected classification under the EEO laws, the
employer must show that the standards are based on generally accepted medical criteria. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Stephen Miller, 3 Checklists for Avoiding LGBTQ Discrimination in Your Benefits
Programs, SOC’Y HUM. RES. MGMT. (June 30, 2020), https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/hrtopics/benefits/pages/3-checklists-for-avoiding-lgbtq-discrimination-in-your-benefit-programs
.aspx; see also Marshall & Pestaina, supra note 14 (discussing the need to obtain expert advice
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and fix discriminatory language and practices, which in turn reduces the
likelihood of lawsuits under Title VII that ensure sex-based (e.g., sexual
orientation and transgender status) protections for employees. These three
checklists can be used to ensure fair treatment for all employees, regardless of
sexual orientation or gender identity.
Table 1 – Employer Checklists to Identify and Correct Discriminatory
Practices 73
# 1 – Review
Benefits Plans 74

# 2 – Amend
Discriminatory
Policies 75

# 3 – Look Broadly for
Bias 76

1

Review group
health plan coverage
for same-sex
spouses, services
related to gender
dysphoria, and
gender-affirmation
surgeries.

Does not cover
treatment for gender
dysphoria or genderaffirmation surgeries
in the group health
plan. The Religious
Freedom Restoration
Act might allow an
exemption for
religious employers.

Ensure compliance with
ongoing contracting
requirements
prohibiting LGBTQ
discrimination if you’re
a federal contractor or
subcontractor.

2

Review your health
plan’s provider
network to ensure
reasonable access to
providers with
expertise in LGBTQ
health care.
Consider creating a
provider directory.

Does not provide
medically necessary
mental health
benefits, hormone
therapy, and some
level of genderaffirmation surgical
benefits for
transgender
employees.

Review benefit
administration genderassignment
requirements, and
consider options for
more inclusive
descriptors, considering
applicable federal/state
laws.

regarding employer health coverage issues after Bostock and providing suggestions for employers
to ensure compliance).
73. The information in Table 1 was gathered from the consolidated advice of law firms, policy
groups, and human resource experts. Miller, supra note 72; Marshall & Pestaina, supra note 14.
74. This column encourages employers to conduct a general review of their plans.
75. This column alerts employers to red flags in their benefits program.
76. This column highlights the importance of employers keeping not only Title VII in mind
when conducting evaluations on health coverage, but also other federal and state laws protecting
the LGBTQ community.
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3

Determine whether
disability plan
coverage includes
temporary disability
due to genderaffirmation surgery.

Does not provide
disability benefits for
short- or long-term
disability due to
gender dysphoria or
gender-affirmation
surgeries.

Review disability plan
coverage for temporary
disability due to genderaffirmation surgeries,
considering applicable
federal/state laws.

4

Consider expanding
family planning
benefits (within the
group health plan or
external) to include
LGBTQ employees
(e.g., adoption
assistance, foster
care, reproductive
technology
assistance).

Does not cover family
planning benefits for
LGBTQ employees if
family planning
benefits are covered
for opposite-sex
couples.

Consider Mental Health
Parity and Addiction
Equity Act compliance
challenges. Putting
limits on behavioral
health treatments for
gender dysphoria may
violate the law if they
are not on par with the
limits on medical and
surgical benefits.

5

Review employee
assistance programs
and related services
to ensure adequate
coverage for the
specific needs of
LGBTQ employees.

Provides coverage to
opposite-sex spouses,
or domestic partners,
but not same-sex
spouses, or domestic
partners, or vice
versa.

For employers receiving
federal funding for their
health plans or other
health activities, follow
developments in
Section 1557
nondiscrimination
guidance.

A.

States Responding to Bostock: New York, Wisconsin, Michigan,
Washington

The Supreme Court’s decision in Bostock is impacting actions among the
states too, as states are using Bostock to interpret their own statutes and
regulations. On June 28, 2020, for example, the New York Department of
Financial Services (DFS) issued Insurance Circular Letter No. 13 (Letter No.
13), which confirmed the prohibition of discrimination “based on sexual
orientation, gender identity or expression, and transgender status in relation to
insurance.” 77 The purpose of Letter No. 13 is to remind health insurers (and
other types of insurers) “of the requirements related to non-discrimination

77. LISETTE JOHNSON, N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF FIN. SERVS., INSURANCE CIRCULAR LETTER
NO. 13 (June 28, 2020), https://www.dfs.ny.gov/industry_guidance/circular_letters/cl2020_13.
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protections.” 78 Additionally, Letter No. 13 was published in response to the
federal government’s action under the Trump administration in removing
“protections prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation, gender
identity or expression, or transgender status.” 79 Recently, the DFS adopted a
regulation that states “an issuer shall not discriminate based on an insured’s or
prospective insured’s actual or perceived sexual orientation, gender identity or
expression, or transgender status”—which applies to “individual, small group,
and large group . . . health insurance policies and contracts that provide hospital,
surgical, or medical expense coverage,” and student health insurance policies. 80
This regulation also prohibits exclusions for “treatments related to gender
transition, gender dysphoria, or gender incongruence”; thus, DFS will not only
deny such language that appears to exclude these treatments but also take action
for failure to adhere to these laws and regulations. 81
On June 29, 2020, the Office of the Commissioner of Insurance in the State
of Wisconsin (OCI) issued a bulletin in response to Bostock detailing the legal
requirements regarding sex discrimination in their Wisconsin-affiliated health
insurance policies. 82 The OCI bulletin asserts that it is unlawful to discriminate
by excluding, limiting or denying “benefits to an insured on the basis of the
insured’s gender identity” and further mandates that all insurers—in both the
private and public sectors—and “self-funded non-federal governmental plans
[must fully] comply with state insurance laws for policies currently in effect.” 83
As a result, OCI states it will not accept any filings from health insurers that
“contain exclusions or limitations on benefits that are based on a person’s gender
identity” 84—which is similar to DFS’s policy in New York.
On August 11, 2020, the Michigan Department of Insurance and Financial
Services (DIFS) issued Bulletin 2020-34-INS (Bulletin), which confirmed that
it, like Bostock, interprets “sex” in “all statutes and rules [under its
78. Id.
79. Id. See Part V for a more thorough regulatory analysis of such action administered by
President Trump.
80. Id. Regulation states an issuer may not deny a “procedure to treat gender dysphoria on the
basis that such procedure is deemed always cosmetic or experimental . . . without conducting an
internal review and providing external appeal rights.” Id.
81. JOHNSON, supra note 77.
82. MARK V. AFABLE, WIS. OFF. OF THE COMM’R OF INS., NONDISCRIMINATION REGARDING
COVERAGE FOR INSUREDS WHO ARE TRANSGENDER OR GENDER DYSPHORIC (June 29, 2020),
https://oci.wi.gov/Documents/Regulation/Bulletin20200629Nondiscrimination.pdf.
83. Id.; see Press Release, June 29, 2020 Wisconsin Insurance Commissioner Says Health
Insurance Discrimination on the Basis of Gender Identity is Illegal, WISCONSIN.GOV (June 29,
2020),
https://oci.wi.gov/Pages/PressReleases/20200629GenderIdentityDiscrimination.aspx
(“While OCI handled cases on an individual basis, Commissioner Afable took the measure of
issuing today’s bulletin to ensure all Wisconsinites understand the protections afforded to them
under the law” because each “person deserves fair and equal access to health care[.]”).
84. AFABLE, supra note 82.
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administration] to include sexual orientation and gender identity.” 85 Fully
insured group health plans are “required to comply with the statutes and rules
administered by DIFS.” 86 Self-funded group health plans, however, are “not
required to comply with the statutes and rules because of ERISA preemption.” 87
Despite this, these plans must still take into account the effects of Bostock in
“certain plan design decisions.” 88 Additionally, ERISA’s preemptive effects
threaten “to thwart many state efforts at health reform [as seen here with
Michigan] and to limit the scope of state health reform insofar as they would
affect employee health benefit plans.” 89 ERISA only applies to employerprovided insurance; 90 but because ERISA also exempts Title VII requirements
from its broad preemptive authority, 91 Bostock applies more broadly than this
state initiative and other initiatives.
The State of Washington is unique in that it established LGBTQ protections
before Bostock was decided but expanded upon these protections afterwards and
focused on specific obstacles to gender-affirming care. On May 12, 2021,
Washington enacted a new law that requires compliance from individual and
small group health insurance plans issued on and after January 1, 2022. 92 These
plans cannot “deny or limit coverage for gender-affirming treatment when it is
medically necessary and prescribed by a medical professional” and cannot
“apply categorical cosmetic or blanket exclusions to gender-affirming
treatment.” 93 Additionally, Washington, unlike other states, explicitly lists
services that insurers can no longer categorically exclude: facial feminization,
tracheal shaves, hair electrolysis, mastectomies, breast reductions, breast
85. ANITA G. FOX, STATE OF MICH. DEP’T OF INS. & FIN. SERVS., BULLETIN 2020-34-INS
(Aug. 11, 2020), https://www.michigan.gov/documents/difs/Bulletin_2020-34-INS_699016
_7.pdf; VanderWal & Liefbroer, supra note 66.
86. VanderWal & Liefbroer, supra note 66.
87. Id. Although state insurance regulation can be saved from ERISA preemption, an
exception is created for state laws that relate to self-funded group health plans, because they are
not deemed to be in the business of insurance. See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW:
CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 438 (8th ed. 2018) for an in-depth discussion of ERISA
preemption. Much gratitude to the SLU Law professors who contributed to this textbook, including
Thomas L. Greaney, Sandra H. Johnson, Robert Gatter, and Elizabeth Pendo.
88. VanderWal & Liefbroer, supra note 66.
89. FURROW ET AL., supra note 87, at 462.
90. Id. at 436.
91. See Jacob Mattinson & Judith Wethall, LGBTQ Title VII Ruling May Impact Your
Employee Benefit Plan, NAT’L L. REV. (June 22, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/article
/lgbtq-title-vii-ruling-may-impact-your-employee-benefit-plan.
92. Washington, Feds Take Action to Solidify Insurance Protections for Transgender People,
OFF. INS. COMM’R, WASH. STATE (May 12, 2021), https://www.insurance.wa.gov/news/washing
ton-feds-take-action-solidify-insurance-protections-transgender-people; S.B. 5313, 67th Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Wash. 2021) (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 48.43.0128 (2021)).
93. Washington, Feds Take Action to Solidify Insurance Protections for Transgender People,
supra note 92; S.B. 5313, 67th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2021).
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implants or any combination of gender-affirming procedures, including
revisions to prior treatment. 94 This law effectively prohibits insurers from
behaving discriminatorily towards patients because of their gender identity.
Although some states are restricting medical care for LGBTQ youth, others
may decide to follow New York, Wisconsin, Michigan, and Washington’s
approach in affirming Bostock’s definition of sex within all state statutes and
rules. These state agencies’ interpretation of their statutes and regulations can
inform the analysis used to determine what suffices as discriminatory actions in
certain situations and, as a result, can be fairly susceptible to litigation
challenges.
V. OVERVIEW OF SECTION 1557
On March 23, 2010, the ACA was enacted, and with it came Section 1557,
which prohibits discrimination in certain health programs or activities—
including providers, hospitals, and medical systems—that receive federal
financial assistance. 95 Section 1557 incorporates protections from four existing
civil rights laws: Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VI) (race, color,
national origin), Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Title IX) (sex),
the Age Discrimination Act of 1975 (Age Discrimination Act) (age), and Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, codified as 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Section 504)
(disability). 96 The language of Section 1557 specifically states that Title VI,
Title IX, the Age Discrimination Act, and Section 504 should be used as sources
for interpretation and enforcement mechanisms of Section 1557—notably
excluding Title VII. 97 The administrative regulations that implement and
interpret the ACA can vary by administration. For example, the inclusion of the
term “sex” in Section 1557 stems from Title IX and is as follows: “No person
. . . shall, on the basis of sex, . . . be subjected to discrimination.” 98 With this,
the Obama and Trump administrations have interpreted “sex” quite differently.
The interpretation of the term “sex” has been a matter of significant controversy.
On May 18, 2016, the Obama administration promulgated regulations to
specifically include “gender identity” and “sex-stereotyping” in its definition of
94. S.B. 5313, 67th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2021); WASH. REV. CODE § 48.43.0128 (2021).
95. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, 124 Stat. 119, 119, 260;
Marshall & Pestaina, supra note 14. Note that most providers, hospitals, and medical systems do
accept federal financial assistance. See discussion infra Part VII.
96. 42 U.S.C. § 18116(a); MaryBeth Musumeci et al., The Trump Administration’s Final Rule
on Section 1557 Non-Discrimination Regulations Under the ACA and Current Status, KAISER FAM.
FOUND. (Sept. 18, 2020), https://www.kff.org/racial-equity-and-health-policy/issue-brief/thetrump-administrations-final-rule-on-section-1557-non-discrimination-regulations-under-the-acaand-current-status/.
97. 42 U.S.C. § 18116(a). Note that Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 is codified
as 29 U.S.C. § 794.
98. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
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“sex,” which extended the ACA’s non-discrimination protections to transgender
and gender nonconforming people. 99 However, on June 19, 2020, the Trump
administration removed these inclusions to revert back to the “original and
ordinary public meaning [of sex]”— which is “the biological binary of male and
female that human beings share with other mammals.” 100 And although health
plans were prohibited from categorically excluding or limiting coverage for
health services related to gender transition under President Barack Obama, 101
President Donald J. Trump removed this provision as well, rolling back even
more LGBTQ protections. 102 As a result, health care providers may be allowed
to deny care to those “who are transgender or who do not conform to traditional
sex stereotypes,” which may also worsen health disparities among LGBTQ
persons. 103
VI. IMPACT OF BOSTOCK ON HEALTH CARE
Section 1557 is one of many examples demonstrating the breadth of
Bostock’s influence as a result of Justice Gorsuch’s broad approach in statutory
interpretation. 104 Because courts traditionally rely on Title VII precedent when
interpreting Title IX 105—and Section 1557 106—Bostock, which interprets Title
VII, challenges the survivability of the 2020 Final Rule and establishes the basis
of EO 13,988 and future rulemaking under the Biden administration. Hence,

99. Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. 31,375, 31,387 (May
18, 2016) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 92).
100. Nondiscrimination in Health and Health Education Programs or Activities, Delegation of
Authority, 85 Fed. Reg. 37,160, 37,160, 37,178 (June 19, 2020) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. 438,
440, 460, 86, 92, 147, 155, 156).
101. Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. at 31,434–35, 31,471–
72.
102. Nondiscrimination in Health and Health Education Programs or Activities, Delegation of
Authority, 85 Fed. Reg. at 37,187, 37,196–99.
103. Musumeci et al., supra note 96.
104. For a discussion of the impact of Bostock in sports and on trans athletes, see Brenna M.
Moreno, “Woman Enough” to Win? An Analysis of Sex Testing in College Athletics, 15 ST. LOUIS
U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 509, 509–29 (2022).
105. See, e.g., Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty. Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 75 (1992) (applying Title
VII’s notion of sexual harassment as sex discrimination in a Title IX claim); Jennings v. Univ. of
N.C., 482 F.3d 686, 695 (4th Cir. 2007); Frazier v. Fairhaven Sch. Comm., 276 F.3d 52, 66 (1st
Cir. 2002); Gossett v. Okla. ex rel. Bd. of Regents for Langston Univ., 245 F.3d 1172, 1176 (10th
Cir. 2001).
106. See Prescott v. Rady Childs. Hosp., 265 F. Supp. 3d 1090, 1099 (S.D. Cal. 2017)
(“Because Title VII, and by extension Title IX, recognize that discrimination on the basis of
transgender identity is discrimination on the basis of sex, the Court interprets the ACA to afford
the same protections.”); see also Tovar v. Essentia Health, 342 F. Supp. 3d 947, 953, 957 (D. Minn.
2018) (arguing that Title VII permits sex stereotyping claims—an insurer failing to cover gender
reassignment surgery—which informs Section 1557).
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Section 1557 prohibits discrimination against LGBTQ persons in health care,
which also impacts both health care delivery and access for all such persons.
A.

Application of Bostock Under Title VII to Section 1557 Under Title IX

Title VII statutory language is identical to Title IX (and thus Section 1557),
which Bostock effectively applies to, as demonstrated by the following analysis:
(1) Title IX is one of Section 1557’s enabling statutes; (2) Title IX prohibits
discrimination “on the basis of sex”; 107 (3) Title VII prohibits discrimination
“because of . . . sex”;108 (4) throughout the opinion, Justice Gorsuch substitutes
“because of” for “on the basis of,” signifying that these two phrases are
interchangeable; 109 (5) Bostock interprets Title VII to prohibit discrimination
“on the basis of” homosexuality or transgender status, of which “homosexuality
[or sexual orientation] and transgender status are inextricably bound up with
sex”; 110 (7) therefore, sexual orientation and transgender status are included in
the definition of “sex” in not only Bostock and, in turn, Title VII, but also under
Title IX and Section 1557. Overall, because Title VII’s “definition of sex” has
consistently informed the “definition of sex” in Title IX, discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation and gender identity is considered sex discrimination
under Section 1557 and is therefore prohibited.
B.

Rejection of President Trump’s 2020 Final Rule

Because EO 13,988 mandates a review using Bostock as guidance, the
review should conclude that the 2020 Final Rule should be rescinded and
replaced with language consistent with Bostock. In part because of Bostock, two
federal district courts have already issued nationwide preliminary injunctions,
preventing the Trump administration from implementing parts of the 2020 Final
Rule. 111 Notably, federal courts, both before and after Bostock, have determined
that sex discrimination under Title IX includes gender identity, and that Bostock
“has significant implications for the meaning of Title IX’s prohibition on sex
discrimination” 112—which is precisely the analysis laid out above. As a result,
challenges to the 2020 Final Rule will likely be successful because, first, courts
107. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
108. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
109. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1737, 1743 (2020).
110. Id. at 1742.
111. Musumeci et al., supra note 96. First, in Walker v. Azar, the Eastern District of New York
blocked provisions “excluding sex stereotyping from the definition of sex discrimination” from
being implemented. Id. However, in Whitman-Walker Clinic v. HHS, Inc., the DC court denied
application of the preliminary injunction to “the elimination of the prohibition on categorical
coverage exclusions for gender-affirming care.” Id. This furthers the inconsistencies among
insurers of what constitutes discriminatory coverage.
112. Id.; Whitman-Walker Clinic, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 485 F. Supp.
3d 1, 41–42 (D.D.C., 2020).
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have previously upheld Section 1557 protections, 113 and, second, courts have
already applied Bostock in similar LGBTQ contexts despite falling under a
different statute. 114 Thus, other federal laws and future courts will find it difficult
not to interpret sex discrimination as LGBTQ discrimination, and even more so
with the execution of EO 13,988.
C. How Does Bostock Impact Health Care Access for LGBTQ Persons? . . .
New Era of LGBTQ Protections Under President Biden
The existence of Bostock cements the long-term survivability of EO 13,988,
its growing application to health care (via Section 1557), and its impact on
LGBTQ access to health care. On January 20, 2021, President Biden signed EO
13,988, aimed to prevent and combat discrimination on the basis of gender
identity or sexual orientation. 115 As a result of the decision in Bostock, the Biden
administration commits “to fully enforce Title VII and other laws that prohibit
discrimination on the basis of gender identity or sexual orientation” and “address
overlapping forms of discrimination.” 116 President Biden claims that under
Bostock’s reasoning, laws and their respective promogulated rules and
regulations that prohibit sex discrimination—including Title IX (and thus
Section 1557)—”prohibit discrimination on the basis of gender identity or
sexual orientation, so long as the laws do not contain sufficient indications to the
contrary.” 117 Discrimination solely on the basis of sexual orientation was not
included in the definition of “sex” in either the 2016 or 2020 rules, 118 yet

113. Wayne Turner, Health Insurers Should be Wary of Trump Regulatory Rollback, NAT’L
HEALTH L. PROGRAM (Aug. 6, 2020), https://healthlaw.org/health-insurers-should-be-wary-oftrump-regulatory-rollback/. The federal district court held that “Section 1557 protections against
sex discrimination include gender identity, and invalidated Medicaid coverage exclusions for
gender affirming care,” despite falling under the protection of a different statute. Id. (discussing the
decision in Flack v. Wisconsin Department of Social Services, No. 3:18-cv-00309-wmc (W.D. Wis.
2019)).
114. See, e.g., Grimm v. Gloucester Cnty. Sch. Bd., 972 F.3d 586, 616–20 (4th Cir. 2020)
(discussing that Bostock “guides [the court’s] evaluation of claims under Title IX”); Adams v. Sch.
Bd. of St. Johns Cnty., 968 F.3d 1286, 1304–05 (11th Cir. 2020), vacated, 3 F.4th 1299 (2021),
reh’g granted, 9 F.4th 1369 (2021). Both cases applied Bostock under Title IX, finding that
prohibition on sex discrimination protects transgender students. See, e.g., Koenke v. Saint Joseph’s
Univ., No. CV 19–4731, 2021 WL 75778, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 8, 2021) (finding “Defendant’s
argument that sexual orientation is not a protected class under Title IX is without merit” because
of the Supreme Court’s holding in Bostock); Doe v. Univ. of Scranton, No. 3:19–CV–01486, 2020
WL 5993766, at *11 n.61 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 9, 2020) (listing cases from sister circuits that have applied
Bostock to sexual orientation discrimination claims under Title IX).
115. Exec. Order No. 13,988, 86 Fed. Reg. 7023, 7023 (Jan. 25, 2021).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. 31,375, 31,390 (May
18, 2016) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 92). In 2016, the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) decided not to
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President Biden includes sexual orientation as a prohibited form of sex-based
discrimination precisely because of Bostock. 119 EO 13,988 instructs the head of
each agency to consider “whether to revise, suspend, or rescind such agency
actions, or promulgate new agency actions, as necessary to fully implement
statutes that prohibit sex discrimination and the policy” discussed above and
“whether there are additional actions that the agency should take to ensure that
it is fully implementing the policy” discussed above. 120 Thus, Xavier Becerra—
current Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)—is
expected to rescind the 2020 Final Rule and promulgate new rules that align with
Bostock. But the Biden administration failed to provide a specific timeline for
issuing a proposed rule for Section 1557. In the meantime, however, Secretary
Becerra announced that HHS will interpret and enforce Section 1557 prohibition
on sex discrimination to include sexual orientation and gender identity as
guidance for the Office for Civil Rights (OCR) in managing complaints and
investigations. 121 Accepting and investigating complaints will allow OCR to
collect data and build an evidentiary record that can be used in future
rulemaking.
It is important to note what this new HHS interpretation fails to do. First,
HHS has not resolved the pending litigation over Section 1557 implementing
rules (2016 Final Rule versus 2020 Final Rule). Second, HHS has not provided
additional guidance on how to not discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation
and gender identity. 122
As EO 13,988 states, “people should be able to access healthcare . . . without
being subjected to sex discrimination. All people should receive equal treatment
under the law, no matter their gender identity or sexual orientation.” 123 So,
implementing anti-discriminatory policies are “necessary to ensure that LGBTQ
resolve whether discrimination on the basis of an individual’s sexual orientation status alone is sex
discrimination. Regardless, in 2020, OCR removed all relevant provisions.
119. Exec. Order No. 13,988, 86 Fed. Reg. 7023, 7023 (Jan. 25, 2021).
120. Id. at 7024.
121. Notification of Interpretation and Enforcement of Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act
and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 86 Fed. Reg. 27,984, 27,984–85 (May 25,
2021). Acting OCR Director Robinsue Frohboese affirmed that “OCR will follow Supreme Court
precedent [Bostock] and federal law, and ensure that the law’s protections extend to those
individuals who are discriminated against based on sexual orientation and gender identity.” HHS
Announces Prohibition on Sex Discrimination Includes Discrimination on the Basis of Sexual
Orientation and Gender Identity, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., https://www.hhs.gov
/about/news/2021/05/10/hhs-announces-prohibition-sex-discrimination-includes-discriminationbasis-sexual-orientation-gender-identity.html (last updated May 25, 2021).
122. See Notification of Interpretation and Enforcement of Section 1557 of the Affordable Care
Act and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 86 Fed. Reg. at 27,984–85 (omitting details
regarding what does and does not constitute discriminatory conduct, where the outcome will be
decided on a case-by-case basis).
123. Exec. Order No. 13,988, 86 Fed. Reg. at 7023.
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individuals can lead long, healthy lives,” and ultimately improve overall
LGBTQ health. 124 LGBTQ persons have a right to be free from discrimination
in health care, and EO 13,988, which explicitly relies on Bostock, paves the way
to enforcing these rights and eliminating barriers in health care.
VII. BEYOND BOSTOCK: PROTECTION UNDER STATE PUBLIC
ACCOMMODATIONS
As previously discussed, Section 1557 does prohibit discrimination by
health care facilities that receive federal financial assistance. Examples of
federal financial assistance include the following: providers participating in the
Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) and other Medicaid programs,
hospitals and nursing homes (Medicare Part A), Medicare Advantage Plans
(Medicare Part C) (e.g., health maintenance organizations (HMOs) and
preferred provider organizations (PPOs)), Prescription Drug Plan sports and
Medicare Advantage Drug Plans (Medicare Part D), social service agencies, and
insurers participating in the ACA-established Marketplaces (federal and state)
and receiving premium tax credits. 125 Although infrequent, a health care facility
may not have to comply with Section 1557’s nondiscriminatory provision if it
does not receive any federal financial assistance. The lack of mandatory
protection against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender
identity in health care may put LGBTQ persons at risk.
Because Title VII does not reach health care facilities in the delivery of
care—another critical gap—Bostock, while revolutionary, does not extend
protections to LGBTQ persons in places of public accommodation, such as
hospitals, pharmacies, and doctors’ offices. This again becomes especially
significant for health care entities who do not have to comply with Section 1557.
Places of public accommodations are not impacted because Bostock impacts
only areas of federal law where sex discrimination is explicitly prohibited.
Because the applicable federal statutes (Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964126
and Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 127) only cover race,
color, religion, national origin, and disability—omitting “sex,” 128—LGBTQ
124. Off. of Disease Prevention and Health Promotion, supra note 3.
125. Off. for C.R., What Qualifies as “Federal Financial Assistance” for Purposes of Civil
Rights Complaints Handled by OCR?, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., https://www.hhs
.gov/civil-rights/for-individuals/faqs/what-qualifies-as-federal-financial-assistance/301
/index.html (last updated Jan. 30, 2022).
126. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a.
127. 42 U.S.C. § 12182.
128. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (“All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of
the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public
accommodation . . . without discrimination on the ground of race, color, religion, or national
origin.”) (emphasis added); 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (“No individual shall be discriminated against
on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges,
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persons have no federal protections against discrimination in public spaces. But
LGBTQ persons may rely on state public accommodations laws to enforce their
rights if protections are provided.
Places of public accommodation are generally defined as any place of
business offering goods, services, facilities, or accommodations to the public. 129
Places of public accommodation, for example, can include medical providers,
hospitals, doctors’ offices, pharmacies, and other public health care entities.
States can enact public accommodations laws that outlaw discriminatory
practices—directly or indirectly refusing, withholding or denying the full and
equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations—in a place of public accommodation. 130 Colorado 131 and New
Jersey, 132 for example, include sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, and
gender expression as protected characteristics from discrimination in addition to
race, color, religion, national origin, disability, and others.
Contrastingly, Pennsylvania, like many other states, 133 failed to codify the
prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, gender identity,
or gender expression in places of public accommodation. 134 Despite this, the
Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission (PHRC), the enforcement agency
of the enabling state statute, released guidance 135 interpreting the law as banning
advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns,
leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.”) (emphasis added).
129. Generally, mosques, synagogues, churches, or any other place that issued for religious
reasons are exempted. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a.
130. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-601 (2021); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12 (West 2020).
131. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-601 (2021).
132. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12 (West 2020). For an example of a fact sheet discussing an
individual’s rights based on gender identity, see 5 Things You Should Know About Protections from
Discrimination or Harassment in Public Accommodations Based on Gender Identity or Expression,
N.J. OFF. ATT’Y GEN., DIV. ON C.R. (Nov. 15, 2019), https://www.nj.gov/oag/dcr/downloads/fact
_LGBTQI_Accomm.pdf.
133. Pennsylvania, Alaska, Florida, Kansas, Michigan, North Dakota, and Ohio do not
explicitly grant protection on the basis of sexual orientation and/or gender identity, but each state’s
agency or attorney general has released guidance interpreting “the state’s existing protections
against sex discrimination to include protections for both sexual orientation and gender identity.”
Local Nondiscrimination Ordinances, MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, https://www.lgbt
map.org/equality-maps/healthcare_laws_and_policies (last visited Jan. 23, 2022). For more details
on the statutes of all fifty states and the District of Columbia, see State Nondiscrimination Laws:
Public Accommodations, MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, https://www.lgbtmap.org/img
/maps/citations-nondisc-public-accom.pdf (last updated Nov. 17, 2021).
134. Amal Bass, Pennsylvania Needs to Codify LGBTQ+ Protections, REGUL. REV. (June 23,
2021), https://www.theregreview.org/2021/06/23/bass-pa-codify-lgbtq-protections/. Other states
include Alaska, Florida, Kansas, Michigan, North Dakota, and Ohio.
135. PA. HUM. RELS. COMM’N, GUIDANCE ON DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF SEX UNDER
THE PENNSYLVANIA HUMAN RELATIONS ACT 1–6 (2021), https://www.phrc.pa.gov/Legal
Resources/Policy-and-Law/Documents/Sex%20Discrimination%20Guidance%20PHRA-3-32021.pdf.
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“discrimination on the basis of sex assigned at birth, sexual orientation,
transgender identity, gender transition, gender identity, and gender
expression.” 136 This guidance was partially influenced by review of the
“evolving case law of interpretations of discrimination ‘because of . . . sex’
under Title VII,” i.e., Bostock. 137 Furthermore, many municipalities have taken
the responsibility of incorporating LGBTQ-inclusive language into their
ordinances. Philadelphia, for example, added sex, sexual orientation, and gender
identity as protected classes. 138
If a state or city prohibits sex discrimination—including sexual orientation
and gender identity—in public accommodations, an LGBTQ resident has the
following rights: “right to not to be refused entry, participation, or services
because you are transgender or gender nonconforming”; “right to enjoy a
business’s services or goods on an equal basis”; “right to dress and present
yourself in a manner consistent with your gender identity” without fear of refusal
because of someone else’s objection; and “right to be free from harassment.” 139
Accordingly, state and local laws are critical in ensuring access and providing
protection beyond the scope of what is covered in federal law.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This Article demonstrates that Bostock requires employer-provided health
insurance to ensure sex-based protections. These protections encompass both
sexual orientation and gender identity due to Bostock’s interpretation of “sex.”
Employers are advised to review and revise their health benefits plans to align
with Bostock. This Article also advocates that although Bostock does not
interpret Section 1557, its approach to interpreting Title VII should be applied
to Section 1557—”sex” includes sexual orientation and gender identity—
because the language in Section 1557 (Title IX) is identical to the language
discussed in Bostock (Title VII). President Biden affirmed this analysis by
signing EO 13,988, which predominately relies on Bostock. This interpretation
will likely be cemented by legal challenges when the Biden administration
promulgates its own final rule to Section 1557.
There are still unresolved issues and barriers to access to health care for
LGBTQ persons. One barrier, for example, is religious objections under both
Title VII and the ACA. 140 Second, whether a particular decision involving
136. Id. at 2–3; Bass, supra note 134.
137. PA. HUM. RELS. COMM’N, supra note 135, at 2.
138. PHILA., PA., CODE § 9–1105 (2013).
139. Public Accommodations, NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL., https://transequality
.org/know-your-rights/public-accommodations (last visited Jan. 23, 2022).
140. See, e.g., Fulton v. City of Phila., 320 F. Supp. 3d 661 (E.D. Pa. 2018), rev’d, 141 S. Ct.
1868 (2021) (remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court opinion); Our
Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Agnes Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049 (2020), as amended (Aug. 16,
2021); Franciscan All., Inc. v. Becerra, No. 7:16-CV-00108-O, 2021 WL 3492338 (N.D. Tex. Aug.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

508

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 15:485

coverage of specific services discriminates against LGBTQ employees as
compared to other non-LGBTQ employees was left unanswered by Bostock.
Therefore, what constitutes a discriminatory coverage decision within an
individual’s health benefits plan will likely be addressed by the courts in the near
future.
Health care entities who, in reliance on Bostock, implement antidiscriminatory practices for LGBTQ persons may promote themselves as an ally
and a LGBTQ friendly space, which helps foster a positive relationship and
experience between the patient and provider. 141 Because of Bostock, future
presidential administrations will not be able to exclude LGBTQ status through
regulation or guidance, as the Trump administration did. 142 Regardless of the
current legal challenges, states are not barred from banning discrimination in
health care on the basis of gender identity, sexual orientation, or other grounds
beyond federal law. This is evident in current state public accommodations laws
that prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex, where sexual orientation and
gender identity are included under the definition of sex. Hence, state action may
be the solution until federal law provides a clear answer on how to protect all
LGBTQ persons within health care.
HIBA B. AL-RAMAHI *

9, 2021). For a discussion on how religious health care organizations and providers are denying
care to transgender patients, see Esther Ju, Unclear Conscience: How Catholic Hospitals and
Doctors Are Claiming Conscientious Objections to Deny Healthcare to Transgender Patients, 2020
U. ILL. L. REV. 1289, 1289–326 (2020).
141. See ASS’N AM. MED. COLLS., IMPLEMENTING CURRICULAR AND INSTITUTIONAL
CLIMATE CHANGES TO IMPROVE HEALTH CARE FOR INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE LGBT, GENDER
NONCONFORMING, OR BORN WITH DSD 2 (2014), https://store.aamc.org/downloadable/download
/sample/sample_id/129/.
142. Congress, however, could always amend Title VII and the other nondiscrimination statutes
to exclude LGBTQ status from the definition of sex. This is beyond the scope of this Article.
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